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IS FULL MARRIAGE EQUALITY FOR SAMESEX COUPLES NEXT? THE IMMEDIATE AND
FUTURE IMPACT OF THE SUPREME COURT’S
DECISION IN UNITED STATES V. WINDSOR
Catherine Jean Archibald*
“No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”1
“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law . . . .”2
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I. INTRODUCTION
As people across the political spectrum sat on the edge of their seats
last summer, the Supreme Court waited until the last possible moment to
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U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
2
U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).
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issue its two same-sex marriage decisions.3
One, decided on a
technicality, did nothing to answer the question of whether same-sex
couples have a constitutional right to marry; though, it did result in the
return of same-sex marriage to California, the most populous state in the
nation.4 The other, a landmark decision, struck down Section 3 of the
Federal Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”) and held that same-sex
couples validly married under state law must have their marriages
recognized by federal law.5 This sweeping decision, United States v.
Windsor,6 issued on June 26, 2013, changed the effect of over 1000 federal
statutes7 and impacted the lives of tens of thousands of same-sex couples
and their children across the country.8
However, the Windsor opinion is limited to “those [in] lawful
marriages,”9 and accordingly has no immediate effect on the laws of the
more than thirty states where same-sex marriage is still prohibited.10
Thus, its impact on future cases challenging state same-sex marriage
prohibitions remains to be seen, although a growing number of courts
have already relied on Windsor to find that various state same-sex
marriage prohibitions are invalid.11 Additionally, the basis of the
The Supreme Court issued both same-sex marriage decisions on June 26, 2013, the last
day of its 2012–2013 session. Jess Bravin, Historic Win for Gay Marriage: High Court Rulings
Lift Bans on Federal Same-Sex Benefits, Weddings in California, WALL ST. J. (June 26, 2013, 8:37
PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014241278873245209045785535000287714
88; Supreme Court Calendar, October Term 2012, http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_
arguments/2012TermCourtCalendar.pdf (last visited Jan. 12, 2014).
4
See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2659 (2013) (holding that the petitioners
did not have standing; therefore, the Court did not have authority to decide the case on the
merits and the district court’s decision requiring the return of same-sex marriage to
California stands); Tony Agurto, Governor Brown Directs California Department of Public
Health to Notify Counties that Same-Sex Marriages Must Commence, CA.GOV (June 28, 2013),
http://gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=18120 (noting that California’s governor directed that
marriage licenses be issued to same-sex couples in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in
Hollingsworth v. Perry).
5
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013).
6
133 S. Ct. 2675.
7
See id. at 2683 (“[DOMA’s] definition of marriage for purposes of all federal statutes
and other regulations or directives covered by its terms . . . does control over 1,000 federal
laws in which marital or spousal status is addressed as a matter of federal law.”).
8
See id. at 2694 (describing DOMA’s negative effect on same-sex couples and their
children).
9
Id. at 2696.
10
See Marriage Recognition, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.org/campaigns/
marriage-center (last visited Aug. 17, 2014) (showing that thirty-one states still prohibit
same-sex marriage); see also Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2689 (noting that, as of its holding, twelve
states and the District of Columbia recognized and permitted same-sex marriage).
11
See, e.g., Bostic v. Schaefer, Nos. 14-1167, 14-1169, 14-1173, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 14298
(4th Cir. July 28, 2014) (relying on Windsor and finding Virginia's ban on same-sex marriage
unconstitutional under the United States Constitution, and not staying implementation of
3
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opinion is not immediately obvious, as it contains elements of
However, by
federalism, due process, and equal protection.12
extensively discussing the traditional state power over marriage,13 and
by describing New York’s decision to extend marriage to same-sex
couples as advancing the cause of equality,14 the decision indicates to
other states that they should likewise eliminate restrictions on same-sex
marriage. If they do not, a close examination of the logic and reasoning
of Windsor leads to the conclusion that future state and federal courts are
likely to find that state same-sex marriage prohibitions are
unconstitutional.

its decision), stayed by Order in Pending Case (573 U.S. August 20, 2014), available at
http://www.afer.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/14A196-McGuigg-v.-Bostic-Order
.pdf#__utma=149406063.1720608795.1375172996.1408483621.1408585803.16&__utmb=14940
6063.8.10.1408585803&__utmc=149406063&__utmx=-&__utmz=149406063.1408481226.14.1.
utmcsr=(direct)|utmccn=(direct)|utmcmd=(none)&__utmv=-&__utmk=231044511); Bishop
v. United States ex rel. Holder, Nos. 14-5003 & 14-5006, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 13733 (10th
Cir. July 18, 2014) (relying on Windsor and upholding district court's finding of
unconstitutionality of Oklahoma's same-sex marriage ban, but staying implementation of
the decision until any appeal to the Supreme Court is decided), aff’g 962 F. Supp. 2d 1252
(N.D. Okla. 2014); Kitchen v. Herbert, No. 13-4178, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 11935 (10th Cir.
June 25, 2014) (relying on Windsor and upholding district court's finding of
unconstitutionality of Utah's same-sex marriage ban, but staying implementation of the
decision until any appeal to the Supreme Court is decided), aff’g 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (D.
Utah 2013); Geiger v. Kitzhaber, Nos. 6:13-cv-01834-MC, 6:13-cv-02256-MC, 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 68171 (D. Or. May 19, 2014) (relying on Windsor and striking down Oregon's samesex marriage prohibitions as violations of the United States Constitution); Whitewood v.
Wolf, 992 F. Supp. 2d 410 (D. Pa. 2014) (relying on Windsor and striking down
Pennsylvania's same-sex marriage prohibitions as violations of the United States
Constitution); Garden State Equal. v. Dow, 79 A.3d 1036, 1038–39 (N.J. 2013) (affirming the
decision of the lower court that found New Jersey must allow same-sex marriage in light of
the Windsor decision); see also Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 962 F. Supp. 2d 968, 973, 979–82, 984,
992, 995–96 (S.D. Ohio 2013) (relying on the reasoning in Windsor and finding that Ohio
must recognize same-sex marriages performed outside the state); Lee v. Orr, No. 13-cv8719, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 173801, at *1–2, *7–9 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 10, 2013) (relying on Windsor
and finding that same-sex couples in Illinois with terminal illnesses must be allowed to
marry even before the Illinois marriage equality law comes into force because “[t]he
putative subclass of medically critical plaintiffs here are likely to succeed on the merits of
their claim that the provisions of the current Illinois law that deny them the right to marry
based solely on their sexual orientation, as applied, violates their constitutional right to
equal protection”); Deboer v. Snyder, No. 12-cv-10285, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98382, at *2,
*5–7 (E.D. Mich. July 1, 2013) (denying a motion to dismiss in a case challenging Michigan’s
same-sex marriage ban because after Windsor, plaintiffs’ claims have “plausibility”).
12
See infra Part III (breaking the Supreme Court’s decision in Windsor into five separate
considerations).
13
See infra Part III.B (discussing the role federalism played in the Supreme Court’s
decision).
14
See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694 (“When New York adopted a law to permit same-sex
marriage, it sought to eliminate inequality . . . .”).
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Justice Ginsburg—one of the Justices signing on to the majority
opinion in Windsor—has written that effective judicial decisions should
“strive[] to persuade.”15 Furthermore, she wrote that “without taking
giant strides and thereby risking a backlash too forceful to contain, the
[Supreme] Court, through constitutional adjudication, can reinforce or
signal a green light for a social change.”16 The Supreme Court’s decision
in Windsor adheres to these ideals.
Part II of this Article describes the background to the Windsor case
and its rise to the Supreme Court.17 Part III analyzes the Supreme
Court’s decision in Windsor, and the elements of federalism, due process,
and equal protection present in the opinion.18 Part IV of this Article
applies the Supreme Court’s decision in Windsor to future same-sex
marriage cases involving challenges to state same-sex marriage
prohibitions; it concludes that the Windsor decision should lead to courts
finding that state prohibitions on same-sex marriage are
unconstitutional, as has already begun to happen.19
II. WINDSOR’S JOURNEY TO THE SUPREME COURT
The Windsor case began when plaintiff Edith Windsor was assessed,
and paid, more than $350,000 in federal income taxes that she would not
have had to pay if her deceased spouse had been male instead of
female.20 Windsor sued in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York, challenging Section 3 of DOMA,21 which
provided that:
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or
of any ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various
administrative bureaus and agencies of the United
States, the word “marriage” means only a legal union
between one man and one woman as husband and wife,
and the word “spouse” refers only to a person of the
opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.22

Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1186 (1992).
Id. at 1208.
17
See infra Part II (setting forth background information to the Windsor decision).
18
See infra Part III (analyzing the Windsor opinion).
19
See infra Part IV (describing how the decision in Windsor will affect future decisions of
state and federal courts); see also supra note 11 (listing a number of court cases that have
already found state same-sex marriage bans unconstitutional in light of Windsor).
20
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2683 (2013).
21
Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
22
1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012).
15
16
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Windsor was validly married under New York state law, where she
and her wife had resided at the time of her wife’s death.23 Windsor
alleged that DOMA violated the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection, applicable to the federal government through the Fifth
Amendment, because it discriminated against her on the basis of sexual
orientation.24
The district court ruled for Windsor, found DOMA unconstitutional,
and ordered that the federal government refund Windsor the tax money
she had paid.25 The district court found that DOMA discriminated based
on sexual orientation and that DOMA was not rationally related to a
legitimate government interest.26 In making its determination, the court
noted that it must perform a more thorough review under the rational
basis test for laws that show “a desire to harm a politically unpopular
The district court declined to decide whether sexual
group.”27
orientation discrimination should be subject to heightened scrutiny, as it
found that the law could not even meet the more lenient rational basis
test.28
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision,
but on slightly different grounds.29 The Second Circuit found that sexual
orientation discrimination should be subject to heightened scrutiny and
that DOMA could not pass heightened scrutiny.30 The Second Circuit
found it unnecessary to decide whether DOMA could pass rational basis
review, as it found heightened scrutiny applied and DOMA could not
meet such scrutiny.31
III. THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN UNITED STATES V. WINDSOR
On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit’s
opinion, finding that DOMA violated the constitutional equal protection

Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683.
Complaint at 3, 21, Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No.
10 Civ. 8435 (BSJ)), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/2010-11-9-WindsorvUSComplaint.pdf.
25
Windsor, 833 F. Supp. 2d at 406.
26
Id. at 402.
27
Id. (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
28
Id. at 401–02; see infra text accompanying notes 94–99 (describing the different levels of
scrutiny used by courts performing equal protection review).
29
See Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 181, 188 (2d Cir. 2012) (affirming the
district court’s decision after applying heightened scrutiny to Windsor’s claim).
30
Id.
31
Id.
23
24
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guarantee.32 However, the Court, like the district court, used rational
basis review to reach this conclusion.33 The Supreme Court also found
that DOMA violated the liberty interest protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.34 In the beginning of its opinion, the
Court engaged in a lengthy discussion of federalism,35 perhaps to
obscure the logical conclusion that just as the federal same-sex marriage
exclusion is unconstitutional, so too are the state same-sex marriage
exclusions still present in most state law. The extensive discussion
regarding state control over marriage also serves to encourage states that
still prohibit same-sex marriage to change their laws.36
A. The Tone of the Supreme Court’s Decision
The tone of the Windsor opinion is persuasive, not combative. The
Court seemed acutely aware that many people would be upset by, and
disagree with, its decision. Thus, the Court bent over backwards to
32
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695–96 (2013); see infra Part III.E (discussing
the Supreme Court’s equal protection analysis).
33
See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2696 (“The federal statute is invalid, for no legitimate
purpose overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure those whom the State,
by its marriage laws, sought to protect in personhood and dignity.”); see also supra text
accompanying note 95 (explaining rational basis scrutiny).
34
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695; see infra Part III.D (explaining that, although the Court did
not identify the specific liberty interest at stake, prior cases suggest the Court likely found
that DOMA infringed upon the fundamental right to marry).
35
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2689–92; see infra Part III.B (discussing in depth the Court’s
federalism analysis).
36
See infra Part III.A (analyzing the Court’s persuasive tone in the Windsor opinion). In
fact, in the slightly more than one year since the Windsor decision, same-sex marriage has
been legalized in seven additional states, through court decisions, executive directives, or
legislation. See, e.g., Geiger v. Kitzhaber, Nos. 6:13-cv-01834-MC, 6:13-cv-02256-MC, 2014
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68171 (D. Or. May 19, 2014) (striking down Oregon's same-sex marriage
prohibitions); Whitewood v. Wolf, 992 F. Supp. 2d 410 (D. Pa. 2014) (striking down
Pennsylvania's same-sex marriage prohibitions); Garden State Equal. v. Dow, 82 A.3d 336
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2013) (finding invalid New Jersey’s same-sex marriage ban in
light of Windsor), aff’d, 79 A.3d 1036, 1045 (N.J. 2013); Griego v. Oliver, 316 P.3d 865, 889
(N.M. 2013) (finding that same-sex couples have the right to marry under the New Mexico
Constitution); see also Religious Freedom and Marriage Fairness Act, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 80/1–997 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 98-626 of the 2013 Reg. Sess.) (legalizing
same-sex marriage in Illinois); Hawaii Marriage Equality Act of 2013, S.B. 1, 27th Leg., 2013
2d Spec. Sess. (Haw. 2013) (legalizing same-sex marriage in Hawaii because Hawaii’s civil
unions cannot provide the same benefits as marriage in light of Windsor); The Associated
Press, Hawaii: Same-Sex Marriage Becomes Law, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2013, at A24, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/14/us/hawaii-same-sex-marriage-becomes-law.html?
_r=0 (noting Hawaii’s decision to legalize same-sex marriage); Agurto, supra note 4
(explaining the effects of California’s law legalizing same-sex marriage); supra note 11 and
accompanying text (citing cases that have found same-sex marriage prohibitions invalid in
light of Windsor).
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show that it understood the sincere belief of those who believe marriage
should only be between a man and a woman. It noted that “marriage
between a man and a woman no doubt had been thought of by most
people as essential to the very definition of that term and to its role and
function throughout the history of civilization.”37
The Court then used gentle persuasive language to explain why this
old view is incorrect: “For others, however, came the beginnings of a
new perspective, a new insight. . . . The limitation of lawful marriage to
heterosexual couples . . . came to be seen in New York and certain other
States as an unjust exclusion.”38 By using positive language to describe
New York’s decision to extend marriage to same-sex couples, the Court
indirectly praised those states that have decided to permit same-sex
marriage. The Court noted that when New York “used its historic and
essential authority to define the marital relation[ship]” to include samesex couples, its “decision enhanced the recognition, dignity, and
protection of [same-sex couples] in their own community.”39
The Court explained that New York, by extending marriage to samesex couples, deemed their relationships “worthy of dignity in the
community equal with all other marriages.”40 This act “reflects both the
community’s considered perspective on the historical roots of the
institution of marriage and its evolving understanding of the meaning of
equality.”41 Furthermore, “[w]hen New York adopted a law to permit
same-sex marriage, it sought to eliminate inequality.”42
The Court’s intent in writing this type of description was most likely
to encourage more states to join the twelve states and the District of
Columbia that had already extended marriage rights to same-sex couples
at the time Windsor was written.43 If states voluntarily join New York in
its quest to “eliminate inequality,”44 the Supreme Court will not have to
force them to do so at a later date.45 Even if not all states change their
laws to permit same-sex marriage, the Supreme Court likely hoped that
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2689.
Id.
39
Id. at 2692.
40
Id.
41
Id. at 2692–93.
42
Id. at 2694.
43
See id. at 2689 (noting that, as of its writing, twelve states and the District of Columbia
recognized and permitted same-sex marriage). Since Windsor was issued, same-sex
marriage has been legalized in seven more states. See supra note 36 (showing that
California, Hawaii, Illinois, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon, and Pennsylvania have
legalized same-sex marriage).
44
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694.
45
See infra Part IV.A (explaining that if states do not voluntarily follow in New York’s
steps, the Supreme Court may force them to do so).
37
38
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its opinion in Windsor would help turn the minority of states now
permitting same-sex marriage into a majority. Then, when it does come
time for the Supreme Court to pronounce that all states must allow
same-sex marriage, the risk of great public outrage will be reduced, as
the Court will not be overturning the law of most states.46
B. Federalism in the Supreme Court’s Decision
The Court spent several pages describing how by history and
tradition, marriage has been largely regulated by the states.47 For
example, the Court noted that “at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution, [the states] possessed full power over the subject of
marriage and divorce . . . [and] the Constitution delegated no authority
to the Government of the United States on the subject of marriage and
divorce.”48 The Court recognized that in limited instances, such as
determining what is a valid marriage for the purposes of immigration
rights and determining who receives life insurance benefits under a
federal program, the federal government may make laws that impact
marriage.49 However, the Court noted that whereas Congress may make
these limited laws to further discrete federal policy concerning federal
programs, DOMA’s impact was much more far reaching than any other
marriage-impacting Congressional act upheld by the Court.50
Thus, upon a first reading of the Court’s opinion, one may have been
fooled into thinking that the Court was going to decide that the federal
government, in enacting DOMA, had overstepped the constitutional
division of power between federal and state governments.51 This guess
would have been bolstered by the fact that partway through its
discussion on the extensive and traditional state power over marriage,
the Court stated: “In order to assess the validity of [DOMA’s]
intervention it is necessary to discuss the extent of the state power and
authority over marriage as a matter of history and tradition.”52
However, at the end of the Court’s lengthy discussion on the traditional
state power over marriage, the Court decided not to decide whether
DOMA was unconstitutional as a violation of the balance of power
46
See Ginsburg, supra note 15, at 1199 (noting that Supreme Court decisions that get too
far ahead of public opinion risk a backlash against the judiciary).
47
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2689–92.
48
Id. at 2691 (quoting Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562, 575 (1906)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
49
Id. at 2690.
50
Id.
51
See id. (noting that DOMA has a very broad reach that affects a class of people that
certain states enacted legislation to protect).
52
Id. at 2691.
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between federal and state governments, declaring: “[I]t is unnecessary
to decide whether this federal intrusion on state power is a violation of
the Constitution because it disrupts the federal balance.”53
Instead, the Court concluded that DOMA, by “depart[ing] from th[e]
history and tradition of reliance on state law to define marriage,” sets off
alarm bells because “[d]iscriminations of an unusual character especially
suggest careful consideration to determine whether they are obnoxious
to the constitutional provision.”54 The Court quoted Romer v. Evans, an
equal protection case, for this proposition.55 Thus, as discussed further
below, the Court’s lengthy discussion of federalism and the states’
powers over marriage served simply to bolster its legal conclusion that
DOMA violated the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth
Amendment.56
However, as mentioned above,57 the lengthy discussion on
federalism may have been included by the Court for three other
purposes: (1) to persuade the majority of states that still prohibit samesex marriage that they should use their historic power to change their
laws and join New York in “eliminat[ing] inequality;”58 (2) to obscure the
fact that the Court’s reasoning necessarily leads to the conclusion that
state same-sex marriage prohibitions are also unconstitutional; and (3) to
provide a basis for courts to distinguish Windsor when faced with future
challenges to state same-sex marriage prohibitions.59
C. The Supreme Court’s Findings on DOMA’s Purpose and Effect
After its extensive discussion on the federal division of power over
marriage, the Court turned its attention to the purpose and effect of

Id. at 2692.
Id. (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
55
See Romer, 517 U.S. at 623–24, 635 (finding unconstitutional as a violation of equal
protection a Colorado constitutional amendment forbidding any local law from protecting
against sexual orientation discrimination because the law was not rationally related to a
legitimate governmental interest).
56
See infra Part III.E (discussing the Supreme Court’s findings on equal protection in
relation to DOMA).
57
See supra text accompanying notes 35–36 (providing ideas as to why the Court
discussed federalism at such length in Windsor); see also infra Part IV (analyzing the likely
impact of Windsor on future cases).
58
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694; see supra Part III.A. (discussing how the Court’s positive
and persuasive tone in Windsor was likely meant to encourage other states to extend
marriage rights to same-sex couples).
59
See infra Part IV.B (noting ways in which courts might distinguish Windsor in future
challenges).
53
54
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DOMA.60 Examining the history and the text of DOMA, the Court found
that it was passed in order to “impose restrictions and disabilities,”61 “to
injure,”62 to promote “traditional moral teachings,”63 “to discourage
enactment of state same-sex marriage laws,”64 and to treat same-sex
marriages recognized under state law “as second-class marriages for
purposes of federal law.”65
The Court found the effects of DOMA were both financial and
emotional. Among other things, DOMA prevented same-sex married
couples and their families from obtaining healthcare and other benefits
they would otherwise receive, and forced them to undergo a complicated
procedure for filing taxes.66 In addition, “DOMA instructs all federal
officials, and indeed all persons with whom same-sex couples interact,
including their own children, that their marriage is less worthy than the
marriages of others.”67 DOMA “humiliates tens of thousands of children
now being raised by same-sex couples” and makes it “difficult for the
children to understand the integrity and closeness of their own family
and its concord with other families in their community and in their daily
lives.”68
D. The Supreme Court’s Findings on Due Process
After discussing the purpose and effect of DOMA, the Court
concluded that DOMA violated the liberty interest protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because “the principal purpose
and the necessary effect of this law are to demean those persons who are
in a lawful same-sex marriage.”69 The Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment provides that: “No person shall . . . be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.”70 The Windsor Court
did not discuss the reasoning behind its due process conclusion.
However, an examination of the Court’s prior due process cases reveals
that the Windsor Court likely reasoned that DOMA impermissibly
infringed upon the right to marry. In prior cases, the right to marry has

60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
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been found to be a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due
Process Clause.71
Under the substantive liberty protection afforded by the Due Process
Clause,72 before the government is permitted to infringe upon a
fundamental liberty interest, it must demonstrate a compelling reason to
do so.73 Fundamental liberty rights have been described as those rights
that are “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,” “so rooted
in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental,” and “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that
neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.”74
However, the Supreme Court recently held that “[h]istory and
tradition are the starting point but not in all cases the ending point of the
substantive due process inquiry.”75 In Lawrence v. Texas,76 the Supreme
Court found that a state could not criminalize private, consensual
homosexual conduct, even though historically, non-procreative sexual
activity was often criminalized.77 The Court in Lawrence noted that “our
laws and tradition afford constitutional protection to personal decisions
relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships,
child rearing, and education.”78 The Court reasoned that, examining the
“laws and traditions in the past half century,” there is “an emerging
awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in
deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to
sex.”79 The Court then concluded that private, consensual, homosexual
conduct should likewise be protected by the liberty interest in the Due
Process Clause.80
Thus, the very specific right in question, private homosexual
conduct, need not have been protected since the nation’s beginning in
order to be protected as a fundamental liberty interest under the Due
71
See infra text accompanying notes 82–83 (discussing marriage as a fundamental right
and explaining what that right encompasses).
72
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, applicable to the federal
government, and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, applicable to the
states, shall be referred to interchangeably here as they both contain the same liberty and
equal protection protections. See infra note 116 and accompanying text.
73
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292,
302 (1993)).
74
Id. at 720–21 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
75
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003) (quoting Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523
U.S. 833, 857 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
76
539 U.S. 558.
77
Id. at 568–69, 578.
78
Id. at 574 (citing Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851
(1992)).
79
Id. at 571–72.
80
Id. at 578.
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Process Clause, so long as a more general right, freedom to “decid[e]
how to conduct [one’s] private li[fe] in matters pertaining to sex,”81 has
been developing in the nation’s laws and traditions.
The right to marry has been found by the Supreme Court to be a
fundamental right protected by the liberty interest of the Due Process
Clause.82 This right includes the right to marry and to choose one’s
marriage partner.83 Thus, though it did not explicitly say so, it is likely
that the Supreme Court in Windsor reasoned that DOMA violated the
liberty interest in the Due Process Clause because it infringed the
fundamental right to marry by demeaning the valid choices of marriage
partner made by same-sex couples. This is so despite the fact that, like in
Lawrence, the very specific right in question—in Lawrence, the right to
engage in homosexual acts,84 and in Windsor, the right to have one’s
same-sex marriage recognized85—has not been protected since the
nation’s beginning. Instead, the more general rights, the right to privacy
in sex and the right to marry a person of one’s choosing, have been
protected and are developing in the nation’s laws and traditions.86
The Supreme Court found that the fundamental right to marry was
implicated when it ruled that prison inmates have a right to marry,87 that
people behind in child support obligations have a right to marry,88 and
that interracial couples have a right to marry.89 This was so despite the
fact that the specific rights in question—to marry when in prison, to
marry while behind in child support obligations, and to marry a person
of a different race—have not been protected since the nation’s beginning.
Similarly, the Supreme Court in Windsor probably reasoned that when
Id. at 572.
See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987) (stating that the decision to marry is a
fundamental right); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639–40, (1974)
(“[F]reedom of personal choice in matters of marriage . . . is one of the liberties protected by
the Due Process Clause . . . .”); Loving v. Virginia, 388 US 1, 12 (1967) (finding state
prohibition on interracial marriage violated the Due Process Clause).
83
Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
84
See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572 (recognizing protection for “adult persons in deciding
how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex”); supra text accompanying
notes 75–81 (discussing the Court’s decision and rationale in Lawrence).
85
See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2682–83 (2013) (invalidating Section 3 of
DOMA, “which excludes a same-sex partner from the definition of ‘spouse’ as that term is
used in federal statutes”).
86
See supra text accompanying notes 81–83 (discussing the general liberty rights the
Court has recognized to choose one’s sexual and marriage partners).
87
See Turner, 482 U.S. at 99 (holding that an almost complete ban on prisoners’ right to
marry was unconstitutional).
88
See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 375, 390–91 (1978) (finding that the statute
limiting those behind in child support from marrying was unconstitutional).
89
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
81
82
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same-sex couples sought to have their marriages recognized by the
federal government, the fundamental right to marry was implicated,
even though the specific right in question—federal recognition of samesex marriage—has not been protected since the nation’s beginning.
Another possibility is that the Court simply found no rational basis
for DOMA, and that in and of itself violated the liberty interest of the
Fifth Amendment. At times, the Supreme Court has found that the
liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause protects a person
from arbitrary government interference with a person’s liberty, even
when that liberty interest is not fundamental.90 However, this doctrine
has fallen out of favor with the Supreme Court in recent years, as it has
been argued that it gives too much power to courts to invalidate
legislation they do not agree with.91 Thus, it is more likely that the
Supreme Court in Windsor simply reasoned that DOMA impermissibly
infringed upon Windsor’s fundamental right to marry.
E. The Supreme Court’s Findings on Equal Protection
Windsor alleged that “DOMA violate[d] the [constitutional]
guarantee of equal protection, as applied to the Federal Government
through the Fifth Amendment.”92 She argued that DOMA, because it
90
See Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845–47 (1998) (expounding on the
recognition that “[s]ince the time of our early explanations of due process, we have
understood the core of the concept to be protection against arbitrary [government] action”);
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 766 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring in judgment)
(noting that the liberty in the Due Process Clause has sometimes been interpreted to “bar
statutory impositions even at relatively trivial levels when governmental restraints are
undeniably irrational as unsupported by any imaginable rationale”); Lisa K. Parshall,
Redefining Due Process Analysis: Justice Anthony M. Kennedy and the Concept of Emergent
Rights, 69 ALB. L. REV. 237, 237 (2005) (noting the traditional liberty due process test of
classifying rights as fundamental or non-fundamental and applying a strict scrutiny or
rational basis test accordingly).
91
See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2706 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(noting that the substantive due process protection for non-fundamental liberty interests
has fallen into “disrepute”); Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721–22 (explaining that requiring the
presence of a “fundamental right” before determining whether the liberty element of due
process has been violated “avoids the need for complex balancing of competing interests in
every case”).
92
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683. The Supreme Court has held that the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment, which applies to the federal government, includes the obligations
of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which applies to the states.
See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976) (“Equal protection analysis in the Fifth
Amendment area is the same as that under the Fourteenth Amendment.”); Bolling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499–500 (1954) (explaining that although the Fifth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution does not contain an Equal Protection Clause, the Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause includes an equal protection component and holding that racial segregation
in public schools violates the Fifth Amendment by denying due process of law).
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discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation, should be subject to
heightened review under the equal protection guarantee.93
Under current Supreme Court equal protection jurisprudence, there
are three tiers of scrutiny that apply to laws allocating different rights
among individuals.94 The most deferential level of scrutiny is “rational
basis” scrutiny, which a challenged law can pass so long as it is
“rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest.”95
The other two types of scrutiny, “intermediate scrutiny” and “strict
scrutiny,” are collectively known as “heightened scrutiny.”96
Heightened scrutiny applies to discrimination on the basis of
characteristics that require special protection, such as sex, illegitimacy,
race, national origin, and alienage.97 To pass heightened scrutiny, a law
must either be substantially related to an important government
interest—intermediate scrutiny98—or narrowly tailored to meet a
compelling state interest—strict scrutiny.99 Although many courts have
decided that laws that discriminate based on sexual orientation must
pass heightened review,100 the Supreme Court thus far has used rational
basis scrutiny to analyze sexual orientation discrimination.101
Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394, 397 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (explaining that the Court “appl[ies]
different levels of scrutiny to different types of classifications,” and that “[b]etween the[]
extremes of rational basis review and strict scrutiny lies a level of intermediate scrutiny,
which generally has been applied to discriminatory classifications based on sex or
illegitimacy”).
95
Lyng v. Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am.,
UAW, 485 U.S. 360, 370 & n.8 (1988) (quoting Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533
(1973)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see, e.g., Ry. Express Agency v. New York, 336
U.S. 106, 107–08, 110 (1949) (upholding a New York traffic regulation because it was
“relat[ed] to the purpose for which it [was] made”).
96
Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1315 n.4 (11th Cir. 2011).
97
See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532–33 (1996) (applying heightened
scrutiny to classifications based on sex); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,
227 (1995) (holding that racial classifications are subject to strict scrutiny); Lalli v. Lalli, 439
U.S. 259, 264–65 (1978) (applying heightened scrutiny to a law that discriminated on the
basis of illegitimacy); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (applying heightened scrutiny
to a classification based on sex); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191–92 (1964) (stating
that classifications based on race are “subject to the ‘most rigid scrutiny’” (quoting
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944))); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633,
640, 646 (1948) (applying heightened scrutiny to ancestry discrimination).
98
Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533.
99
Pena, 515 U.S. at 227.
100
See, e.g., Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 181–82 (2d Cir. 2012) (concluding that
“review of . . . DOMA requires heightened scrutiny” because, among other reasons,
homosexuals as a group have historically endured discrimination and remain members of
“a politically weakened minority”); Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d
968, 989–90 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (applying heightened scrutiny to justifications proffered for
DOMA); In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 443 (Cal. 2008) (stating that classifications
93
94
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In Windsor, the Supreme Court did not discuss Windsor’s argument
that sexual orientation discrimination should be subject to heightened
review. Instead the Court used the language of the lowest level of
review, rational basis review, to find that DOMA violated the Fifth
Amendment’s equal protection guarantee.102 The Court found that
DOMA is “invalid, for no legitimate purpose overcomes the purpose and
effect to disparage and to injure those whom the State, by its marriage
laws, sought to protect in personhood and dignity.”103 Presumably
because the Court found that DOMA could not pass rational basis
review, it did not decide whether DOMA should be subject to
heightened scrutiny.
IV. THE FUTURE OF STATE SAME-SEX MARRIAGE PROHIBITIONS
Justice Ginsburg has criticized the Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v.
Wade,104 opining that the Court should have declared unconstitutional
the extreme Texas law at issue in the case, without going further “on that
day.”105 She reasoned that by issuing a narrow decision, the Court
would have avoided “displac[ing] virtually every state law then in
force”106 and would have “reduce[d] rather than . . . fuel[ed]
controversy,”107 by encouraging other branches of government to act in
line with the Court’s decision.108 If Justice Ginsburg is correct that Roe
went too far, Windsor was careful not to make the same mistake.
Windsor invalidated Section 3 of DOMA, the statute at issue in the
case, but went no further. It explicitly limited its holding “to those [in]
lawful marriages.”109 Thus, the laws of the more than thirty states that
still prohibit same-sex marriage remained unchanged in Windsor’s
immediate wake.110 However, the Windsor decision, by extensively
based on sexual orientation must pass heightened review); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub.
Health, 957 A.2d 407, 431–32, 476 (Conn. 2008) (holding that sexual orientation is a quasisuspect classification subject to heightened scrutiny); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 896
(Iowa 2009) (“[L]egislative classifications based on sexual orientation must be examined
under a heightened level of scrutiny . . . .”).
101
E.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635
(1996).
102
See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013) (invalidating DOMA as the
government did not have a legitimate interest in enacting the statute).
103
Id.
104
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
105
Ginsburg, supra note 15, at 1199.
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
Id. at 1208.
109
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013).
110
Supra text accompanying note 10.
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discussing states’ historic power over marriage,111 by using laudatory
language to describe New York’s extension of marriage to same-sex
couples,112 and by condemning DOMA’s purpose and effect as
“demean[ing],”113 encourages states that have not yet legalized same-sex
marriage to do so soon, and gives a strong basis for invalidating state
same-sex marriage bans to courts adjudicating such challenges.
A. Applying Windsor to Future Same-Sex Marriage Cases
A close reading of Windsor reveals that if a state does not heed the
Supreme Court’s gentle nudge and legalize same-sex marriage, it may
well be forced to do so in a future case before the Court, at least if the
Court still contains the five Justices that joined the majority opinion in
Windsor.114 Although in Windsor, the Supreme Court comprehensively
discussed the states’ historic and traditional power to regulate marriage,
it was careful to note that such power is “subject to constitutional
guarantees.”115 States are held to the same liberty due process and equal
protection requirements as the federal government, although it is the
Fourteenth Amendment that applies to states and the Fifth Amendment
that applies to the federal government.116
See supra Part III.B (exploring the Court’s federalism discussion).
See supra Part III.A (explaining that the Court’s use of positive language indirectly
praises those states, such as New York, that permit same-sex marriage).
113
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694–95.
114
Id. at 2681 (indicating that the majority consisted of Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg,
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan); see id. at 2709 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“In my opinion . . . the
view that this Court will take of state prohibition of same-sex marriage is indicated beyond
mistaking by today’s opinion.”). Four Justices in Windsor would have found DOMA
constitutional. Chief Justice Roberts authored a dissenting opinion. Id. at 2696 (Roberts,
C.J., dissenting). Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas and joined in part by Chief Justice
Roberts, also authored a dissenting opinion. Id. at 2697 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Further,
Justice Alito, joined in part by Justice Thomas, composed a separate dissenting opinion. Id.
at 2711 (Alito, J., dissenting) .
115
Id. at 2692 (majority opinion).
116
See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976) (“Equal protection analysis in the Fifth
Amendment area is the same as that under the Fourteenth Amendment.” (citing
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975))); Hibben v. Smith, 191 U.S. 310, 325–
26 (1903) (noting that the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment is, among other things, to
afford citizens the same protection for their liberty as they receive under the Fifth
Amendment); Tonawanda v. Lyon, 181 U.S. 389, 391–92 (1901) (“The purpose of [the
Fourteenth] Amendment is to extend to the citizens and residents of the states the same
protection against arbitrary state legislation affecting life, liberty, and property, as is
afforded by the 5th Amendment against similar legislation by Congress.”); Inmates of
Orient Corr. Inst. v. Ohio State Adult Parole Auth., 929 F.2d 233, 235 (6th Cir. 1991) (“The
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . imposes the same restraints on the
states that the corresponding clause of the Fifth Amendment imposes on the national
government . . . .”).
111
112
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Most of the criticisms the Court levied against DOMA would apply
equally, or very similarly, to state same-sex marriage prohibitions.117 If
DOMA’s principal purpose and effect is to demean same-sex couples in
lawful marriages,118 it is hard to imagine a state same-sex marriage
prohibition whose principal purpose and effect is not to demean samesex couples desiring to enter lawful marriages. In Windsor, the Supreme
Court found that the purpose and effect of DOMA was to treat same-sex
marriages as “second-class marriages for purposes of federal law;”119 to
“write[] inequality into the entire United States Code;”120 and to
“identify a subset of state-sanctioned marriages and make them
unequal.”121 It is hard to see how the Court would not also find that the
purpose and effect of a state same-sex marriage prohibition is to treat
same-sex relationships as “second-class,” to “write inequality” into state
law, and to “identify a subset” of committed-couple relationships and
“make them unequal.”122
Just as the Windsor Court found that DOMA “humiliates tens of
thousands of children now being raised by same-sex couples” and makes
it “difficult for the children to understand the integrity and closeness of
their own family and its concord with other families in their community
and in their daily lives,”123 a state same-sex marriage prohibition does
the same. Just as DOMA “prevents same-sex married couples from
obtaining government healthcare benefits they would otherwise
receive”124 and many other benefits,125 so too does a state same-sex
marriage prohibition prevent same-sex couples from obtaining myriad
benefits they would receive if they were permitted to marry under state
law.126
117
See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2709 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting “[h]ow easy it is, indeed
how inevitable, to reach the same conclusion [on DOMA’s purpose and effect] with regard
to state laws denying same-sex couples marital status”); see also Michael J. Klarman,
Windsor and Brown: Marriage Equality and Racial Equality, 127 HARV. L. REV. 127, 158 (2013)
(recognizing that “it is hard to argue with [Scalia’s] claim that very little change to the
Windsor opinion would be required to extend it to forbid state bans on same-sex
marriage”).
118
Windsor, 133 S. Ct at 2695.
119
Id. at 2693–94.
120
Id. at 2694.
121
Id.
122
See supra notes 119–21 (providing citations to the relevant portions of the Windsor
opinion).
123
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694.
124
Id.
125
Id. at 2694–95.
126
In addition to state benefits that same-sex couples may not be able to access without
access to marriage, after Windsor, there are the hundreds of federal benefits only available
to married same-sex couples. See Garden State Equal. v. Dow, 79 A.3d 1036, 1039 (N.J.
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B. Possible Bases to Distinguish Windsor in Future Same-Sex Marriage
Cases
The Court’s federalism discussion concluded that DOMA, by
intruding on state power, was “‘[d]iscrimination[] of an unusual
character’” that made an equal protection violation more likely.127 This
is one line of reasoning that lower courts faced with a challenge to a state
same-sex marriage prohibition could use to distinguish Windsor.
Whereas in Windsor, the federal government intruded on traditional state
power to define marriage, a state is exercising its traditional state power
to define marriage when it prohibits same-sex marriage.
However, the Court’s federalism discussion had no obvious bearing
on its conclusion that DOMA violated the liberty interest protected by
the Due Process Clause because it “demean[ed] those persons who are in
a lawful same-sex marriage.”128 Thus, even if a future court finds that
Windsor’s reasoning does not apply to an equal protection challenge to a
state same-sex marriage prohibition, it will be harder for that court to
distinguish Windsor’s reasoning to a due process challenge to the same
prohibition.
Nonetheless, it is likely that at least some state and federal courts
will distinguish Windsor when deciding whether a state same-sex
marriage prohibition is constitutional, as encouraged to do so by one
dissenting Justice in Windsor.129 Courts could distinguish Windsor by
2013) (noting that “civil-union partners in New Jersey today do not receive the same
benefits as married same-sex couples when it comes to family and medical leave, Medicare,
tax and immigration matters, military and veterans’ affairs, and other areas”).
127
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692 (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996)). See
supra Part III.E for a discussion of the Court’s findings on equal protection.
128
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695. See supra Part III.D for a discussion of the Court’s findings
on due process.
129
See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2709 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (encouraging “[s]tate and lower
federal courts [to] . . . distinguish away” when adjudicating challenges to state same-sex
marriage prohibitions); see also id. at 2696 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (noting that the
majority opinion “does not decide, the distinct question whether the States . . . may
continue to utilize the traditional definition of marriage”); id. at 2720 (Alito, J., dissenting)
(“[T]he question of same-sex marriage should be resolved primarily at the state level . . . .”).
Note, however, that even if a court does distinguish Windsor in a future same-sex marriage
case, it could still find that a state same-sex marriage prohibition is unconstitutional. Cf.
Catherine Jean Archibald, De-Clothing Sex-Based Classifications—Same-Sex Marriage Is Just the
Beginning: Achieving Formal Sex Equality in the Modern Era, 36 N. KY. L. REV. 1, 5–13 (2009)
(arguing that same-sex marriage prohibitions are a type of sex discrimination that should
be judged with strict scrutiny). See generally Catherine Jean Archibald, Two Wrongs Don’t
Make a Right: Implications of the Sex Discrimination Present in Same-Sex Marriage Exclusions for
the Next Supreme Court Same-Sex Marriage Case, 34 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 1 (2013) (explaining
how same-sex marriage prohibitions are unconstitutional because they constitute sex
discrimination and cannot pass the heightened review applicable to such discrimination).
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noting: its extensive discussion on how states traditionally have the
power to decide who can marry supports rather than detracts from a
state’s decision to prohibit same-sex marriage; the Windsor Court
specifically limited its holding to same-sex couples married under state
law;130 and the history and text of DOMA is necessarily different from a
state’s same-sex marriage prohibition because it is a different law.131
However, many more courts facing future challenges to state samesex marriage prohibitions are likely to find that because Windsor held
that DOMA’s purpose and effect violates the equal protection and due
process guarantees of the U.S. Constitution, so too do state-law same-sex
marriage prohibitions, as a growing number of lower courts have
already found.132 The Supreme Court did not go so far as to say so in
Windsor, probably in the hope of reducing rather than fueling
controversy,133 and in the hope of encouraging more states to legalize
same-sex marriage on their own initiative.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s decision in Windsor is a seminal decision that
gave hundreds of new rights to same-sex married couples. However, the
Windsor opinion limits its holding to “those in lawful marriages” and so
has no immediate effect on the laws of the more than thirty states where
same-sex marriage is still prohibited. Nonetheless, this Article has
shown that the opinion in Windsor paves the way for more same-sex
couples to be able to marry in the future by: encouraging more states to
voluntarily extend marriage rights to same-sex couples; and making it
more likely that courts in future cases will decide that state same-sex
marriage prohibitions are unconstitutional.

Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2696.
See id. at 2697 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (noting that the “statute-specific
considerations” discussed in the majority opinion “will . . . be irrelevant in future cases
about different statutes”).
132
See supra Part IV.A (discussing Windsor’s application in future same-sex marriage
cases). A growing number of courts have already used Windsor’s reasoning to find invalid
state same-sex marriage prohibitions and other state laws. See cases cited supra note 11
(providing recent cases in which courts have relied on Windsor to find same-sex marriage
prohibitions invalid in their respective jurisdictions).
133
See Ginsburg, supra note 15, at 1199 (explaining that to “reduce rather than to fuel
controversy,” the Court should refrain from doing more than necessary to decide the
constitutionality of a case).
130
131
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